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The Status of Opposition Fighters in a NonInternational Armed Conflict

Michael N. Schmitt'

T

he treaty law appl.icable to the classification of participants in a noninternational conflict is limited to Common Artide 3 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions l and the 1977 Additional Protocol ILl The former is generally
deemed reflective of customary international law, whereas the latter is not (although certain individual provisions thereof certainly are)) O ther treaties apply
during non-international ar med conflicts, but do not bear on the issue of classifying those involved in the conflict. 4
Comm o n Article 3, which ap pears in each of the four Geneva Conventio ns. provides no specific guidance as to who qualifies as a "Party to the conflict," although

subsequent case law has clarified that the article encompasses conflict at a certain
level of intensity that occurs between a State's armed forces and organized armed
groups, or between such groups.5 Textually, the article merely refers to "persons
taking no active part in hostilities," including "members of the armed forces" who
are 1I0rs de combat.6 The reference is somewhat useful in that it suggests a normative distinction between those who actively participate in a non-international
armed conflict and those who do not. Yet, the failure to address party status
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directly is unfortunate, for it begs the question of when non-State individuals or
groups qualify as a party. Complicating the issue of participant classification is the
fact that Common Article 3 makes no mention of the category "civilians."
Additional Protocol II contains slightly more granularity in its provision on the
instrument's material field of application. Article 1 extends coverage to "all armed
conflicts" between the armed forces of a State party to the Protocol and "dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this ProtocoL'"
This is a higher threshold of applicability than that of Common Article 3 in two regards. 8 First, it does not include conflicts that are solely between organized armed
groups; a State must be involved. 9 Second, the group in opposition to the government must exercise a certain degree of control over territory. The higher thresholds
are not dealt with in this chapter, as they bear on the law that applies to a conflict,
not on the status of its participants. What is significant with regard to classification
of participants, though, are the references to dissident armed forces and organized
armed groups.
Additional Protocol II also adopts the notion of "civilian," most notably in Article 13 on the "protection of the civilian population." That article extends "general protection against the dangers arising from military operations" to civilians,
and specifically prohibits both attacks against them and any actions intended to
terrorize the civilian population, but withdraws said protection "for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities."lo Unfortunately, Additional Protocol II, in
contrast to its international armed conflict counterpart, offers no definition of the
term "civilian."11
Taking the two treaties together, and in light of Common Article 3's customary
status, it can be concluded that two broad categories of non-international armed
conflict participants lie in juxtaposition: civilians and organized armed groups.
The former can be subdivided into those who directly participate in hostilities and
those who do not. Organized armed groups consist of a State's armed forces, dissident armed forces or "other" organized armed groups.
This chapter examines the three types of "opposition fighters "---dissident
armed fo rces, other organized armed groups and civilians directly participating
in hostilities. A companion contribution to the volume deals with the status of
government fighte rs. The chapter does not address the criteria fo r the existence
of a non-international armed conflict, the subject of other con tributions, except
as that topic bears on classificat ion of participants. 12 Accordingly, it does not
explore such contentious topics as whether a non-international armed conflict
can exist during a belligerent occupation, the legal status of a confli ct with
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transnational terrorists, internationalization of a con flict through intervention of
another State or external State control of insurgent groups. Rather, assuming a
non-international armed conflict (whatever form it takes), it asks how opposition
force participants in the conilict are to be classified. I3
The significance of classification is limited. For instance, the international
armed conilict concept of combatancy and the related notion of belligerent immu nitydo not exist in non-international armed conilidS. 14 Members of the opposition forces may be prosecuted for any acts that violate domestic law, even if they
are not violations of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), as is the case with attacking
members of the armed forces . IS In light of the absence of combatancy in a noninternational armed conflict, this chapter has adopted the term "fighters" in lieu
of "combatants" to refer to those who participate in the conflict.16 Similarly, there
is no prisoner of war regime in the context of a non-international armed conflict,
although, as explained in the chapters on detention, certain basic protections do
inure to the benefit of detainees in these conilicts.
The key consequences of classification lie in the law of targeting, for classification determines whether LOAC prohibits an attack on an individual during a noninternational armed conilictY To the extent no prohibition exists on attacking
persons with a particular classification, harm to an individual within that group
plays no role in proportionality calculations (except as military advantage) and need
not be considered when determining the precautions that attackers are required to
take during attacks to avoid harming civilians. 18 As will become apparent, the
targetability of the various categories of opposition fighters is a matter of some
contention in LOAC circles.
Before turning to an examination of the various categories of opposition fighters, it should be briefly noted that if the forces of another State intervene on behalf
of the opposition, an international armed conflict ensues between that State and
the State against whom the pre-existing rebellion is under way; the conflict has been
internationalized. 19 Unless the external State exercises a sufficiently high level of
control over the opposition forces, a non- international armed conilia continues
between those forces and their government.20 Because the external State's forces
are involved in an international armed conilid, their status, which would be that of
combatants, is not examined below. 21

Ind ividuals Who Are No t Members of a "Traditional" Opposition Force
As a general rule, individual criminals and purely criminal groups do not constitute "parties" to a non- international armed conflict, regardless of whether they
engage alone in acts of violence against the government (or non-government
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organized anned groups) or operate in the midst of an ongoing non-international
anned conflict. Since they neither are a party nor operate on behalf of one, domestic
law and international human rights nonns will usually govern actions taken against
them.
The offidallnternational Committee of the Red Cross (JCRe) commentary on
Common Article 3 suggests that the drafters intended to preclude its applicability
to com mon criminality. Early in the drafting process, a proposal to extend the 1949
Geneva Conventions to "all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, o r wars of religion,
which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties"22
was met with objection on the basis that it might be interpreted as applying to situations involving " no more than a handful of rebels or common brigands."23 Further concern was expressed about the " risk of ordinary criminals being encouraged
to give themselves a semblance of organization as a pretext for claiming the benefit
of the Convention, representing their crimes as 'acts of war' in order to escape punishment for them. "24 According to the commentary, numerous delegations concluded that" [t Jhe expression [not of an international character] was so general, so
vague, that ... it might be taken to cover any act committed by force of arms-any
form of anarchy, rebellion, o r even plain banditry."2s
Proponents of the text in question were sensitive to these concerns, responding
that "insurgents . . . are not all brigands" and "the behaviour of the insurgents in the
field would show whether they were in fact mere felons, or, o n the contrary, real
com batants who deserved to receive protection under the Conventions. "26 The
JCRe's non-binding and non-exclusive list of sample criteria for non-international
armed conflicts, by making reference to "the Party in revolt against the de jure
Government" and "insurgents," adopts the same position,27 one likewise strengthened by the ICRC Commentary's use elsewhere of the term "rebel Party."28
As these examples illustrate, the law of armed conflict traditionally envisioned
non-international armed conflict as consisting of only those activities evidencing
some sort of politically motivated challenge to State authorities in order to attain
political control and authority or displace those of the government. However, the
evolving nature of criminality has brought this traditional understanding into
question.
Consider the criminal gangs active in Colombia and Mexico. 29 They field forces
today that often outgun the regular armed fo rces. Unlike brigands, bandits and
other criminals who merely take advantage of the instability characterizing armed
conflict, these gangs directly challenge State authorities in order to create zones in
which they can with impunity pursue their criminal activities. The respective governm ents must resort to military fo rce to counter the organizations, civilians are
122

Michael N. Schmitt
placed at great risk from the ensuing hostilities and criminal gangs often control
wide swaths of territory.
In other words, these are situations in which criminal gangs are highly organized and conduct hostilities with the government at a level of intensity consistent with the existence of a non-international armed confljct. There is little to
distinguish them from the Commentary's description of Common Article 3 noninternational armed conflicts as "armed conflicts, with armed forces on either
side engaged in hostilities--conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar
to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country."30
To the extent that the law of non-international armed conflict frees States to deal
militarily with high-order political violence through application of LOAC conduct of hostilities rules, the same rationale would justify application to sufficiently organized and intense criminal activity directed against the State. Such an
interpretation would be consistent with the assertion in the commentary on
Common Article 3 that "the scope of application of the Article must be as wide as
possible."3l Accordingly, it is at least arguable that in light of the context and
nature of the criminal armed activities States face today, imposing a political
motivation requirement, in addition to organization and intensity, for qualification as a non-international armed conflict makes little normative or practical
sense.
Should members of a criminal group or individual criminals become involved
in a non-international armed conflict on behalf of one of the parties, they would
qualify as members of an organized armed group or direct participants in hostilities, respectively, as those appellations are described below. With regard to groups,
their activity in support of the party, considered as a whole, would have to constitute what is in a sense "group participation in hostilities" before qualifying as an
organized anned group involved in a non-international armed confljct. Key factors in such an assessment include the nature of the group's activity and its nexus to
the conflict. For instance, if a dissident armed force that controls territory allows a
criminal group to engage in criminal activities in exchange for conducting attacks
on the State's armed forces, guarding its military facilities or providing logistics for
its combat operations, the criminal group would be operating on the dissident
group's behalf and therefore qualify. By way of contrast, merely paying a "tax" on
production or transhipment of drugs to an organized armed group in control of an
area, as is the case in Afghanistan with certain narcotics organizations, would not
render the criminal group an organized armed group.32
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Dissident Anned Forces
The most straightforward category of opposition forces is dissident armed forces .
As noted, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II both utilize the term
"armed forces,» the fonner with regard to protections that attach once m embers
thereof are Ilors de combat, the latter in its provision on material field of application. The con text of the Common Article 3 reference clearly implies the possibility
of "armed forces" on both sides of a non-international armed conflict, since the
relevant provision applies to "each Party to the conflict. "33 This interpretation becomes express with Additional Protocol II's reference to "dissident" armed forces.
In the latter instrumen t, the phrase "dissident armed forces" is used in contradistinction to " other organized armed gro ups." On this basis, it might be argued
that "other organized anned groups" constitutes a separate category fro m dissident
armed forces, a point with which the author disagrees since there is no meaningful
difference in the legal regimes governing the detention or targeting of the two categories. However, acknowledging that some commen tators distinguish among vario us members of an "other organized group" with regard to targeting, a point to be
discussed, this chapter treats dissident armed forces and other organized armed
groups separately for the sake of analysis.
What is clear is that dissiden t armed forces do not attain civilian status by virtue
of their break from the State's regular military. According to the JCRe's 2009 Inter-

pretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,
Although members of dissident armed forces are no longer members of SUte armed
forces, they do not become civilians merely because they have turned against their government. At least to the extent, and for as long as, they remain organized under the
structures of the State armed forces to which they formerly belonged, these structures
should continue to determine individual membership in dissident armed forces as
well. 34
While other aspects of the Interpretive Guidance proved con troversial, this text
elicited no serious objection from the international experts participating in the
drafting process. JS
Yet, merely having been members of the armed forces of a State does not suffice
to qualify individuals as members of a dissiden t armed force. Only breakaway units
that retain some d egree of their original organizational structure qualify.)6 Fighters
who are former members of the armed forces but have not remained with their
units (such as deserters) are either m embers of o ther organized armed groups or
civilians directly participating in hostilities.
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Near-universal consensus exists that dissident armed forces, like members of
the State's armed forces, are targetable at all times under the law of armed conflict.
Stated with greater precision, it is not a violation of the lawof armed conflict to "attack" themY This is evident from the plain text of Common Article 3(1), which
protects persons who are taking no active part in hostilities from acts of violence,
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms or are lIors
de combat. The only reasonable interpretation of the provision is that those members of the armed forces who are still "in the fight" lack protection from attack under LOAC during a non-international armed conflict. This position comports with
the common understanding of the principle of distinction, which requires an attacker to distinguish between combatants and civilians and direct attacks only
against the former. The principle is universally accepted as customary law in both
international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.38
Although the notion of "armed forces" transcends the boundary between
international and non-international armed conflict, its precise parameters do
not. Plainly, members of the regular armed forces qualify as "armed forces" in a
non-international armed conflict, as do members of the regular armed forces in rebellion against the State.3~ The concept of armed forces in international armed conflict includes "militia and volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces."40 It
is reasonable to extend this inclusion into non-international armed conflict such
that they would also qualify as part of the State's armed forces, or, if in rebellion, a
component of the dissident armed forces.
The case of paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies involved in a noninternational armed conflict is more complicated. As a matter of customary international law in international armed conflict, they may be incorporated into the
armed forces, and thereby lose any claim to civilian status. 41 Additional Protocol I
adds a further requirement, that incorporation be notified to the other party to the
conflict,42 although by customary law incorporation is solely a factual matter and
failure to so notify the enemy does not preclude such groups' treatment as members of the armed forces for purposes of targeting and detention. 43
The situation in non-international armed conflict differs markedly. In that opposition fighters are in violation of domestic law by virtue of their armed activities,
law enforcement agencies necessarily engage in operations against them. Accordingly, in non-international armed conflict there is no logic for incorporation;
fighting lawlessness is the very raison d'etre of law enforcement entities, a task undiminished by the existence of a non -international armed conflict. Thus, even if
wholly separate from the military, perhaps even conducting autonomous operations that are not coordinated with those of the armed forces, law enforcement and
similar agencies qualify as the armed forces for the purposes of non-international
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armed conflict classification. The Cotlltlletltary to Additional Protocol II explicitly
embraces this interpretation:
The te rm "armed forces" of the High Contracting Party should be understood in the
broadest sense. In fact, this term was chosen in preference to others suggested such as,
for example, "regular armed forces", in order to cover all the armed forces, including
those not included in the definition of the army in the national legislation of some
countries (national guard, customs, police forces or any other similar force).44

To the extent any such groups--or units thereof-act in opposition to the government, they will be considered and treated as "dissident armed forces. "
Finally, it is possible for State armed forces to be transformed into opposition
organized armed groups once they lose power. This was the situation in Afghanistan upon either adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 in
December 2001 orthe installation of Hamid Karzai as interim president during the
June 2002 {oya jirga. 45 Arguably, it is also the situation of Qaddafi's forces, at least
from the perspective of those States, such as the United States, which have recognized the Transitional National Council as the legitimate government of Libya.
Whether former military forces qualify as a dissident armed force or "other organized armed group" is unresolved as a matter oflaw, but this is of lin Ie practical significance in light of the position taken in this chapter that dissident armed forces
are but a category of organized armed forces. 46

Other Organjzed Anned Groups
A second category of opposition forces consists, for the sake of analysis, of "other
organized armed groups," an expression drawn from the text of Additional
Protocol II. It is well established that the existence of an armed conflict requires
the participation of an armed force of some sort . In the context of international
armed confli ct, this requirement poses little difficulty. Armed forces of one State,
which are organized by definition, face those of another. By contrast, the situation
is more complex in non-international armed con fl ict, for armed conflict must
be distinguished from "situations of internal d isturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature."4 7 In
Tadii, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the forme r
Yugoslavia (ICTY) made such a distinction by defining non-international armed
conflict as situations of "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State,"48 a
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test combining intensity and organization which has been adopted in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 49
Until recently, it was unclear whether organized armed groups other than the
dissident ar med forces co mprise groups who are di rectly participating in
hostilities or constitute a separate category of" non-civilians."50 Neither Common
Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II directly addresses the scope of the concept of
civilian. As noted, the former avoids the term altogether, instead simply extending
protection to those taking no active part in hostilities, while the latter employs the
term without defining it. sl
The issue of whether members of organized armed groups are civilians or a separate category bears on the conduct of hostilities. In particular, Article 13 of Additional Protocol I, which is generally accepted as reflective of customary
internationallaw,52 provides:
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terro r among the civilian population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection affo rded by this part, unless and for such ti me
as they take a direct part in hostilities. 53

So, if the members are civilians, they are only targetable while participating in the
hostilities. If not, they may be treated as analogous to members of the armed forces,
and thereby remain targetable even when not participating.
The ICRC acknowledged this normative dilemma in its 2005 Customary International Humanita rian Law study:
It can be argued that the terms "dissident armed fo rces or other organized armed
groups .. . under responsible command" in Article 1 of Additional Protocol II inferentially recognise the essential condi tions of armed forces, as they apply in international
armed conflict . . .• and that it follows that civilians are all persons who are not members of such forces or groups. Subsequent treaties, applicable to non-international
armed conflicts, have similarly used the terms civilians and civilian population without
defining them.
While State armed forces are not considered civilians, practice is not clear as to whether
members of armed opposition gro ups are civilians subject to Rule 6 on loss of protection from attack in case of direct participation or whether members of such groups are
liable to attack as such, independently of the operation of Rule 6 [which deals with the
issue of direct participation in hostilitiesJ.S4
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This very issue occupied the attention of a group of international experts convened by the ICRC from 2003 to 2008 to consider the notion of direct participation
by civilians. Various suggestions were offered, including an approach by which
members of an organized armed group might be treated as civilians who were continuously participating in hostilities, and therefore continuously legitimate targets.
However, the ICRC worried that the approach would "seriously undermine the
conceptual integrity of the categories of persons underlying the principle of distinction, most notably because it would create parties to non-international armed conflicts whose entire armed forces remain part of the civilian population,"ss a point
later acknowledged by the District Court for the District of Columbia in Gherebi.56
Accordingly, the Interpretive Guidance took the reasonable position that "as the
wording and logic of Article 3 GC I-TV and Additional Protocol II reveals, civilians,
armed forces, and organized armed groups of the parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive categories also in non-international armed conllict."$7 Individuals
who are members of organized armed groups are accordingly not civilians. 58 The
ICfY embraced this stance in Galic. S9 This is an important point, for if members of
an organized armed group are not civilians, the LOAC extending protection to
civilians is inapplicable to them. For instance, they may be attacked regardless of
whether they are directly participating; their vulnerability to attack is stat us, not activity, based.
Not all groups in a battlespace are "organized armed groups." To qualify, the
group in question must be both "organized" and "armed." With regard to the organized criterion, Article 1 of Additional Protocol I refers to a group that is "under
responsible command." This phrase is explicatory of the notion of organization.
The ICRC commentary to the article explains that
[tJhe existence of a responsible command implies some degree of organization of the
insurgent armed group or dissident armed forces, but this does not necessarily mean
that there is a hierarchical system of military organization similar to that of regular
armed fo rces. It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of planning and carrying out sustained and concerted military operations, and on the other, of imposing
discipline in the name of a de facto authority.60

The ICfY dealt with the issue of the threshold level of organization in the case of

Limaj. In assessing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Trial Chamber held that
some degree of organisation by the parties will suffice to establish the existence of an
armed conflict. This degree need not be the same as that required for establishing the
respo nsibility of superiors for the acts of their subordinates within the organisation, as
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no determination of individual criminal responsibility is intended under this provision
of the Statute.61

It went on to d te an JCRC docwnent submitted to the Preparatory Commission
for the Rome Statute's elements of crimes, which stated that armed conflict "presupposes the existence of hostilities between armed forces organised to a greater or
lesser extent. "62 Looking to factors like the existence of a general staff and headquarters, designated military zones, adoption of internal regulations, the appointment
of a spokesperson, coordinated military actions, recruitment activities, the wear of
uniforms and negotiations with the other side,63 the Chamber concluded that the
KLA was an organized armed group,64 a determination consistent with those in
other cases examining the same issue.6s
Similarly, in the Haradinaj case the ICfY surveyed all previous judgments relevant to the issue of organization before concluding that no single factor was necessarily determinative. Rather, the Trial Chamber suggested a holistic approach.
Illustrative factors that bore on organization included
existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the abilityof the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including
troop moveme nts and logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use
military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude
agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords.66

These cases suggest two indispensable elements of the "organized" criterion. To
begin with, the group in question must exhibit a degree of structure. The structure
need not be strictly hierarchical or implemented in any formalistic manner, although such factors are highly indicative of the required organizational robustness.
For instance, many non-military organized anned groups have flat and decentralized structures. Yet, as has been noted elsewhere, while such organizational models
may complicate identification of a group's members, "operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq demonstrate that these challenges are not insurmountable. "67 Nor need
an organized armed group have explicit ranks, wear distinctive emblems, operate
from established bases or recruit in a particular fashion.
That said, a group that is transitory or ad hoc in nature does not qualify; in other
words, an organized armed group can never simply consist of those who are engaging in hostilities against the State, sans plus. It must be a distinct entity that the
other side can label the "enemy" for reasons ranging from the development of field
strategy and tactics to the conduct of negotiations. A qualifying group must also be
capable of exercising some degree of control over the activities of its members. In
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particular, it must be sufficiently organized to enforce compliance with LOAC,
although failure to actually do so does not bar qualification as an organized armed
groUp.68
Additionally, to be "organized," a group must be able to act in a coordinated
fashion, albeit not to the extent of the regular armed forces. This requirement implies an ability to plan and execute group activities, collect and share intelligence,
communicate among members, deconflict operations and provide logistic support
to combat operations. Collective action alone, in the sense of multiple autonomous
actions against the State (or another organized armed group), does not suffice; the
actions engaged in must evidence a group character.
The organization requirement is especially relevant in three regards. First, there
is no non-international armed conflict equivalent of international armed conflict's
levee en masse.69 An uprising against the government, no matter how intense, can
only constitute a non-international armed conflict once the opposition begins to
exhibit some degree of organization. Until then, it is an internal disturbance and
thereby excluded from the ambit of non-international armed conflict.
Second, an organized armed group cannot consist solely of those who share the
same basis for opposition to the government, for they lack the requisite degree of
organization and coordination. As an example, whereas individual terrorist groups
in a non-international armed conflict may qualify separately as organized armed
groups, it is only once they begin to affiliate and to coordinate their activities that
they become a single organized armed group. Consider al Qaeda, an organized
armed group consisting of loosely related subgroups. The fact that others may
share al Qaeda's ideology or are inspired by the organization does not alone suffice
to qualify them as al Qaeda members. Instead, they are either members of a separate organized armed group, civilians directly participating in hostilities or mere
violent criminals. Thus, there can, legally, be no such thing asa "war on terrorism"
as such, because the generic category of terrorists cannot constitute a single party to
an armed conflict. It is only once particular groups are somehow affiliated and plan
or coordinate activities in concert that they may be treated as a distinct organized
armed group.
Third, cyber attacks have raised the possibility of virtual organization. Online
organizations are commonplace in contemporary life. In many cases, the members
thereof never physically meet. They may not even know the identities of other
members. If a collection of online hackers conducts related operations against a
government (assuming such operations rise to the level of armed actions as a matter oflaw), can it meet the organization criterion? Along similar lines, can persons
who conduct kinetic actions as members of a group constituted and coordinating
entirely online make up an organized armed group?
130

Michael N. Schmitt
Individuals operating autonomously, even if targeting the same State entities,
are not an o rganized armed group. There is no organizational element and their
actions lack coordination. A similar conclusion would hold with regard to individuals who operate collectively, but not cooperatively. During the cyber attacks
against Georgia in 2008, for example, a website appeared containing hacker tools
and a list of Georgian government and civilian targets. 70 Using that site, hundreds
of individuals began conducting individual attacks. Again, the absence of organization and of cooperative activities would preclude characterization of the attackers as members of an organized armed group.
On the other hand, a virtual group can have a specific leadership and organizational structure and conduct highly synchronized cyber operations. The only apparent obstacle to qualification as an organized armed group would appear to be
the requirement that organizational structure allow for enforcement of LOAC.
There is presently no consensus as to whether the difficulty a virtual group would
have enforcing LOAC precludes qualification as an organized armed group, such
that the virtual members would at most qualify as civilian direct participants.
The second criterion of an organized armed group is that it be "armed." Logically, a group is armed when it has the capacity to carry out "attacks," defined in
LOAC as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence."71 Such acts must be based on the group's intentions, not those of individual
members. This conclusion derives from the fact that while many members of the
armed forces have no violent function, the armed forces as a whole are nevertheless
"armed" as a matter of LOAC. 72 Conversely, the mere fact that certain members of
a group participate in hostilities does not render the group "armed" absent a
shared purpose of carrying out the qualifying attacks.
More problematic is a group that does not itself carry out attacks, but performs
acts that amount to direct participation in hostilities, such as collecting tactical intelligence for use by other groups in specifi c attacks. To the extent that acts constituting direct participation render individual civilians subject to attack, it is a
reasonable extrapolation to conclude that a group with a purpose of directly participating in the hostilities is "armed." Of course, such groups could only exist in the
context of a non-international armed conflict in which another group was conducting attacks, fo r without attacks there is no armed conflict in the first place.
The one area of potential difficulty with regard to the anned criterion involves
groups that engage in cyber operations. By the approach taken above, a group of
this kind would have to be mounting operations that rose to the level of a cyber "attack" as a matter oflaw or otherwise be engaging in cyber activities that amounted,
as discussed, to direct participation in either cyber or kinetic attacks. While disagreement exists as to which cyber operations constitute attacks under LOAC,73
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there is consensus that any cyber operation resulting in injury to or death ofinruviduals or damage to or destruction of objects qualifies. There is also agreement
that cybcr activities that merely cause inconvenience or irritation do not.
Certain organized groups consist of both armed and non-armed wings. This is
the case, for instance, with Hamas and Hezbollah. It is generally accepted that
when the group in question is composed of subgroups, only those that engage in
hostilities qualify as organized armed groups. Individuals who straddle both wings,
such as the overall leader, are members of the armed subgroup, notwithstanding
their non-hostile roles.
Controversy surrounds one aspect of status as a member of an organized armed
group. Specifically, the question is who among the members may be attacked when
not directly engaged in hostilities. A restrictive view, represented by the Interpretive
Guidance, adopts the notion of "continuous combat function" as the key to membership. The term is defmed as a "continuous function for the group involving his
or her direct participation in hostilities. "74
Although the question of which acts qualify as "direct participation" is itself
somewhat contentious,7s the issue need not be explored here. Suffice it to say that
by the Guidance standard only those with a continuous combat function may be
treated as members of an organized armed group and therefore attackable at any
time during the period of their membership. Absent such a function, individuals
affiliated with the group are to be treated as civilians who can only be attacked for
such time as they participate in the hostilities. 76
In justification, the Interpretive Guidance correctly notes the difficulty during a
non-international armed conflict of distinguishing civilians from members of organized armed groups, and points to the fact that membership in an organized
armed group is seldom formalized, "other than taking up a certain function for the
group."n Groups may not wear uniforms, operate from fixed bases or fight employing classic military tactics and they are often organized informally and operate
clandestinely. Complicating matters is the reality that civilians in the battlespace
may carry weapons for their own protection. Therefore the requirement of continuous combat function , by setting a high bar for membership, appears to afford the
civilian population enhanced protection from mistaken attacks.
These concerns are valid, but, for both practical and normative reasons, overstated. In fact, organized armed groups often have a membership structure based
on more than mere fu nction. Members frequently wear uniforms or other distinguishing garb and may operate from ftxed bases, especially when in control of territory or operating from remote locations.18 For example, the Red Army, Hamas,
Hezbollah, FARC, Tamil T igers and KLA were often distinguishable from the civilian population and operated in a manner not unlike the regular armed forces.
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Membership may also be confirmed by intelligence ranging from human sources
and communications intercepts to captured documents and interrogation of captured fighters. So, from a practical perspective, it is frequently a relatively simple
matter to discriminate between civilians and members of organized armed groups.
When it is not, the law itself takes account of the uncertainty. Article 50.1 of Additional Protocol I, a provision generally deemed reflective of customary international law in both international armed conflicts and non-international armed
conflicts,~ provides that "[ i]n case of doubt whether a person isa civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian."
The result of the continuous combat function criterion is therefore inequity in
the law. By the proposed standard, direct attack on a member of an organized
armed group without a continuous combat function is prohibited (indeed, such an
attack would bea war crime since the individual qualifies as a civilian), but a member of the State's armed forces who performs no combat-related duties may be attacked at any time. This is a rather curious result in light of the fact that the
organized armed group lacks any domestic or international legal basis for
participation in the conflict in the first place. The standard badly skews the balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations that undergirds
all ofLOAC.8(1
A more reasoned approach, and one that better comports with the underlying
logic of the distinction between civilians and organized armed groups, is to simply
treat insurgent fighters and members of the armed fo rces equally. By it, members
of organized armed groups may be attacked so long as they remain active members
of the group, regardless of their function. It makes no more sense to treat an individual who joins a group that has the express purpose of conducting hostilities as a
civilian than it would to differentiate between the various members of the regular
armed forces . After all, and as noted in the Interpretive Guidatlce itself (albeit in the
context of international armed conflict),
it would contradict the logic of the principle of distinction to place irregular armed
forces under the more protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population
merely because they fail to distinguish themselves from that population. to carry thei r
arms openly, or to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war. Therefore, even under the terms of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions. all armed actors showing a sufficient degree of military organization and belonging to a party to the conflict must be rega rded as part of the armed forces of that
party.Sl

A fmal issue with regard to organized armed groups in non-international armed
conflicts involves mixed conflicts, that is, conflicts with both international and
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non-international components. The Interpretive Guidance raises this prospect in
its assertion that "organized armed groups operating within the broader context of
an international armed conflict without belonging to a party to that conflict could
still be regarded as parties to a separate non-international armed conflict. "82 A
group belongs to a party when at least a de facto relationship exists between the
group and the party to the international armed conflict. Mere tacit agreement suffices so long as it is clear for which side the group is fighting. 83 The basis for the position is straightforward-since only States may be party to an international armed
conflict, a non-State group would have to be affiliated with a State to qualify as a
party. By contrast, non-international armed conflict necessarily involves at least
one party that is not a State or otherwise an extension thereof.
The prospect of groups appearing in the battlespace that do not belong to any of
the parties to an international armed conflict is far from hypothetical. For instance,
during the international armed conflict phases in Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition
troops regularly faced forces that were not allied with the Taliban or the Baathist
regimes. In particular, certain Shia militia groups in Iraq opposed both the coalition forces and those of the Iraqi government in the hope of eventually seizing
power themselves.
From a practical perspective, an approach that automatically renders hostilities
with a non-affiliated organized armed group as a separate non-international
armed conflict is problematic in that it requires application of separate bodies of
law to colocated hostilities. Therefore, an argument can be made that it is preferable to ask whether there is an unambiguous nexus between the actions of the group
in question and the international armed conflict. S4 If so, the law applicable in international armed conflict would continue to govern hostilities with the group. Ifnot,
the group would qualify as an organized armed group in a non-international
armed conflict.
Regardless of one's position on this specific issue, there are undoubtedly situations in which international and non-international conflicts coexist.8s For instance, a non-international armed conflict may survive in a situation where an
international armed conflict breaks out. In Afghanistan, non-international armed
conflict between the Taliban-Ied Afghan government and the Northern Alliance
was under way at the time coalition forces began operations in 2001. Until the coalition exercised "overall control" of Northern Alliance operations, that conflict
continued alongside the international armed conflict between the coalition States
and Afghanistan.86
Despite the complexity of classifying conflict, it is important to emphasize the
fact that classification of participants in such conflicts tracks the criteria normally
applied in the two types of confli cts. The fact that an international armed conflict is
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ongoing in the same battlespace and at the same time as a non-international armed
conflict has no bearing on qualification of any groups involved in the latter as
"organized armed groups."

Civilians Who Directly Participate in Hostilities
The final category of fighters in armed opposition to the government comprises individuals who are members of neither dissident armed forces nor any other organized groups. Their activities alone cannot constitute a non-international armed
conflict, for such a conflict cannot exist without an organized armed group on at
least one side. Thus, the category of directly participating civilians only has meaning in the context of an ongoing non-international armed conflict.
Individuals "who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous,
sporadic or unorganized basis" make up the category.87 Examples include those
who engage in individual acts for pay (e.g., a fee for emplacement of improvised explosive devices (lEOs)) or for other reasons unrelated to group affiliation, as well as
groups of individuals who take part in the hostilities without prior organization
and coordination (as in a mob that attacks a military facility). By the Interpretive
Guidance's approach, the category would extend to those members of an armed
group who do not have a contin uous combat function , but which at times take up
arms or engage in other acts amounting to direct participation.
The topic of direct participation in hostilities has been the subject of extensive
and lively discourse in the literature and need only be summarized here. S8 It is an
important debate, for, unlike members of the dissident armed forces and other organized armed groups, direct participants may only be attacked while they engage
in acts of participation. As noted in Additional Protocol II, Article 13.3, civilians
enjoy protection from attack, "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities." Resultantly, the options for targeting them are dramatically reduced.
With regard to the concept of direct participation, two questions are key: ( I )
what acts qualify a civilian as a direct participant in hostilities; and (2) when is he or
she participating? The Interpretive Guidance proffers three cumulative "constitutive elements" of acts that constitute direct participation.
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacityof a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold ofhann), and
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and
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3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of
harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent
nexus).89
These criteria generally capture the essence of direct participation, although
there is some disagreement with the standards around the margins. 90 For instance,
the firs t criterion could be expanded to encompass acts that enhance one's own
military capacity, rather than merely negatively affecting the enemy. Further, the
causal link as explained in the Guidance is overly restrictive.91 As an example, it excludes assembly of an improvised explosive device on the basis that such participation is indirect.92 This assertion flies in the face of common sense; no State that
engages in combat could reasonably accept it. The Guidance also labels voluntary
human shielding as indirect, a position that is likewise highly questionable. 93 Despite such concerns, the three elements fairly capture what is generally understood
to be direct participation-acts that militarily affect the parties in a fairly direct
manner and that are related to the ongoing armed conflict.
Much more problematic is the question of when may direct participation be
said to be happening, for a civilian only loses imm unity from attack during that period. At issue is the "for such time" verbiage in the direct participation norm,
which is properly characterized as customary in nature. 94
The Interpretive Guidance asserts that "measures preparatory to the execution of
a specific ad of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and
the return fro m the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of the
act."95 However, many of the experts involved in the project of developing the
Guidance argued for a broader interpretation of "preparatory," such that the period
of participation should extend as far before and after a hostile action as a causal
connection existed.96 As an example, the b roader approach would include assembling an lED and perhaps even acquiring the necessary materials.
There was also significant objection to the Interpretive Guidance's assertion that
individuals who participate in hostilities on a recurrent basis regain protection
from attack between their operations, losing it again only upon launching the next
attack. This dynamic has become known as the "revolving door," which the Guidance somewhat curiously suggests is an "integral part, not a malfunction of lHL. "97
The approach flies in the face of military common sense and accordingly represents a distortion of LOAC's military advantagelhumanitarian considerations balance. This is especially so in the context of irregular warfare, where clandestine
activities by insurgent groups are common. Again, consider the case of an IED attack.
If the insurgent is discovered deploying to the attack location, implanting the lED
or returning from the operation, the attack will likely be foiled since lED attacks are
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usually only successful when the devices can be laid secretly. As a result, the best
option for countering future attacks is through heuristic intelligence analysis,
which would reveal patterns ofIED-implanting activities that allow for pinpointing those involved through human and technical intelligence. Yet by the Interpretive Guidance position, they could not be attacked until launching the next
operation, an unacceptable result militarily.
The only viable approach is one in which a civilian who directly participates in
hostilities on a recurring basis remains targetable until he or she opts out of the
hostilities in an unambiguous manner. There is, of course, a risk that a direct participant might actually have decided to cease all hostile activities without the
knowledge of the forces he or she has been attacking. But it is more sensible to have
the participant, who enjoyed no right to participate in the first place, bear the risk
of mistake rather than his or her former victims. The requirement to presume civilian status in the event of reasonable doubt further mitigates this risk.
Conclusions

In a non -international armed conflict, opposition fighters can be divided into two
categories-members of an organized armed group and civilian direct participants
in hostilities. The former category includes dissident armed forces and other
groups that are both "organized" and "armed." The argument that a member of an
organized armed group must be treated as a civilian if he or she does not have a
continuous combat function in the group was rejected as both impractical and
contrary to the logic of the law.
The result of this binary classification is that there is no LOAC prohibition on
attacking members of organized armed groups at any time, just as there is no international law prohibition on attacking members of the government's forces.% Only
when dealing with a fighter who is unaffiliated with a group, and who is therefore a
civilian temporarily deprived of protection as such, does a temporal limitation
arise. This approach accords neatly with the foundational premise of the law of
armed conflict-that the law must balance military necessity and humanitarian
considerations. Further parsing of the prevailing binary classification or otherwise
complicating it will only serve to confuse matters in what is perhaps the most confusing genre of conflict-that which is non-international.
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